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1WHEN WORLDS COLLIDE: FEDERAL CONSTRUCTION
OF STATE INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE

Marcia L. McCormick*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 70s there was an . . . anti-war slogan: “What if they held a war and
nobody came?” The contemporary . . . counterpart to this would be “What if
we staged a revolution and nobody noticed?”
—Handy Fuse, Simply Appalling1

The Supreme Court has staged a federalism revolution, but nobody
noticed. Well, actually, many have noticed that some kind of revolution is
happening, but few can make much sense of it, and nearly everyone has
missed a piece that is revolutionary in its own right.2 To many, the Court
seems to be limiting the power of the federal government and expanding
that of the states, as recent Commerce Clause, Tenth Amendment, and
Eleventh Amendment cases suggest.3 But at the same time that it has
expanded state power in these areas, the Supreme Court has limited state
power and expanded national power in others.4
*

*
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Chemerinsky for his willingness to read prior drafts. I would also like to thank all of the members of
the Cumberland faculty who participated in a workshop on this paper. And, finally, thank you to Bill
Jones for outstanding research assistance. Any errors, technical or substantive, are mine alone.
1
Simply Appalling: A Jaundiced Eye on the News, http://simplyappalling.blogspot.com/
2005/05/second-american-revolution-goes.html (May 16, 2005, 07:49 EST) This statement appeared as
part of a post on right-wing revolutions and nuclear weapons. The original antiwar slogan is probably
derived from a poem by Carl Sandberg, who wrote, “Sometime they’ll give a war and nobody will
come.” CARL SANDBURG, THE PEOPLE, YES 43 (1936). The sentiment has undergone a number of
permutations in service of various goals, and this permutation seemed appropriate to this topic.
2
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Understanding the Rehnquist Court: An Admiring Reply to
Professor Merrill, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 659, 659 (2003) (critiquing Professor Merrill’s “stunning article”
analyzing the Rehnquist Court as “incomplete in a few important respects”).
3
See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative
Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 233–41 (2001) [hereinafter Jackson, Narratives]
(discussing recent Supreme Court case law on federalism as a constraint on national power); Vicki C.
Jackson, Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity, and the Denationalization of Federal
Law, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 691, 699 (2000) [hereinafter Jackson, Seductions] (“There is no doubt we are in
the midst of a federalist revival.”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A
Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 570–71 (2003) (noting the dominance of constitutional
federalism as a theme of the second Rehnquist Court).
4
See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 659 (identifying a downward shift in the level of deference the
Rehnquist Court gave elected branches of government); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing
Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 82–83 (2001) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court was not consistently in
favor of States’ rights); Merrill, supra note 3, at 571 (critiquing theories of the Rehnquist Court that
ignored evidence of the Court’s favoring national power in certain circumstances).

1
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One of these expansions of national power has been in a reduction of
the amount of deference the Court seems willing to grant to state court
interpretations of state law. The method of this expansion lies in the
Court’s imposition of federal separation of powers principles on state
governments. In three cases in recent years, the Supreme Court
differentiated between the branches of government at the state level to
justify a refusal to defer to the state courts. It had never done so before.
By relying on a seemingly neutral federal principle, without analyzing its
applicability to the new context, the Court hid the aggrandizement of power
to itself.
The first case, which we are all familiar with, and in fact are probably
weary of, is Bush v. Gore.5 Here, the Supreme Court ordered an end to a
recount of ballots cast in the 2000 presidential election.6 Justice
Rehnquist’s concurring opinion argued that the Florida Supreme Court’s
interpretation of state law should be rejected. Because the United States
Constitution delegates the power to design elections to the legislatures of
the States, the Court had a duty to ensure that the state judicial branch was
faithful to the will of the state legislative branch.7 He explained that, given
this federal constitutional duty, reviewing and rejecting the state court
interpretation of state law “does not imply a disrespect for state courts but
rather a respect for the constitutionally prescribed role of state
legislatures.”8
A similar concurrence was issued by Justice Scalia in the 2006 term, in
Kansas v. Marsh.9 In that case, the Kansas Supreme Court had held that
the State’s death penalty statute violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.10 Scalia emphasized
in his concurrence why it was important for the Supreme Court not to let
states overenforce federal constitutional principles:
When state courts erroneously invalidate actions taken by the people of a State
(through initiative or through normal operation of the political branches of their
state government) on state-law grounds, it is generally none of our business;
and our displacing of those judgments would indeed be an intrusion upon state
autonomy. But when state courts erroneously invalidate such actions because
they believe federal law requires it—and especially when they do so because
they believe the Federal Constitution requires it—review by this Court, far
from undermining state autonomy, is the only possible way to vindicate it.
When a federal constitutional interdict against the duly expressed will of the
people of a State is erroneously pronounced by a State’s highest court, no
authority in the State—not even a referendum agreed to by all its citizens—can
undo the error. Thus, a general presumption against such review displays not
respect for the States, but a complacent willingness to allow judges to strip the

5

531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
Id. at 105–11 (holding that any recount attempting to meet the statutory deadline would be
unconstitutional).
7
Id. at 112–13 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
8
Id. at 115.
9
126 S. Ct. 2516, 2529–39 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring).
10
Id. at 2520-21, 2529.
6
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people of the power to govern themselves. When we correct a state court’s
federal errors, we return power to the State, and to its people.11

After Bush v. Gore, a flurry of scholarly contributions debated the
propriety of not deferring to the state court’s interpretation of state law, but
none addressed the Court’s construction of state separation of powers in a
systematic way.12
That flurry over the concurrence may have been much ado about
nothing, except that, in addition to the concerns appearing in another
concurrence, those same sentiments provided a foundation for a unanimous
court, deciding a relatively mundane equal protection challenge to a state
tax, to reject an interpretation of state law by a state supreme court.13 The
Court stated that “the Constitution grants legislators, not courts, broad
authority (within the bounds of rationality) to decide whom they wish to
help with their . . . laws and how much help those laws ought to provide.”14
In other words, rather than defer to the state court, the Supreme Court
deferred to the state legislature. To date, this case, Fitzgerald v. Racing
Association, has not even been a blip on the radar screen of federalism
scholars.
Fitzgerald is representative of the cases federal courts routinely
encounter where they are asked to consider an issue of state law. That a
state court had already analyzed the law at issue does not make this case
Id. at 2530-31 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Two scholars have raised the issue prior to this article. Louise Weinberg discussed the issue in
these terms, but devoted only a small portion of her article to the issue. Louise Weinberg, When Courts
Decide Elections: The Constitutionality of Bush v. Gore, 82 B.U. L. REV. 609, 625–27 (2002). Instead,
Professor Weinberg focused primarily on the fact that the Court decided the outcome of the election,
arguing that action was an unconstitutional aggrandizement of power. See id. at 620 (“[T]he Court’s
action was obviously incompatible . . . with the Constitution of the United States.”). Additionally,
Mark Tushnet wrote that Vicki Jackson suggested this separation-of-powers issue in an e-mail to him in
2001. Mark Tushnet, Renormalizing Bush v. Gore: An Anticipatory Intellectual History, 90 GEO. L.J.
113, 124 n.64 (2001).
13
Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 108 (2003). At issue were the taxes on
the proceeds of slot machines at the State’s racetracks and riverboats; these proceeds were the primary
source of revenue for both types of gaming establishments. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald,
648 N.W.2d 555, 557, 559 (Iowa 2002), rev’d, 539 U.S. 103 (2003). At the State’s horse and dog
racetracks, slot machine proceeds were taxed at a maximum of 36%, while at the State’s riverboats,
they were taxed at a maximum of 20%. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 99F.4A(6), .11 (West 2004). Finding that
the proceeds were similarly situated, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the higher taxation on racetrack
proceeds was irrational because it frustrated the purpose of the act creating it. Fitzgerald, 648 N.W.2d
at 561. The legislative purpose found by the Iowa Supreme Court was to provide another source of
revenue to the State’s racing industry in an effort to make an unprofitable venture profitable again. Id.
at 560. Taxing the proceeds at the racetracks at a much higher rate than that of the riverboats threatened
that profitability, defeating the purpose of the act. Id. at 560–62. Before the Iowa Supreme Court, the
State argued that the purpose of the act was to encourage economic growth and promote agriculture.
Id. at 560. The court found that even if this were the purpose of the act, this purpose, too, was
frustrated by the higher tax rate on racetracks. Id. at 561.
On appeal, the racetracks argued that, when the Iowa Supreme Court determined what the purpose
of the act was, the court was interpreting Iowa law and its interpretation deserved the deference that is
almost always accorded state supreme court declarations of state law. Transcript of Oral Argument at
26, Fitzgerald, 539 U.S. 103 (No. 02-695). In other words, the interpretation of the Iowa Supreme
Court was binding on the United States Supreme Court. See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 590, 632–33 (1874) (holding that state courts are the final interpreters of state law, and the
Supreme Court is limited to reviewing only questions of federal law).
14
Fitzgerald, 539 U.S. at 108.
11
12
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much more unusual. In every one of those cases, federal courts must
decide whether to defer to the state-court analysis and, if so, by how much.
Federal courts will often defer, but many times they have not done so, and
they rarely explain the reasons for the departures they make. This Article
explores the reasoning behind the courts’ decisions about deference and
endeavors to provide some guidance for when federal courts should defer
to state-court pronouncements of state law.
More specifically, Part II of this Article illustrates the lines of authority
on deference for different types of state statutory questions. Part III then
suggests the principles that underlie this distinction, and Part IV proposes
guidelines for federal courts to use in analyzing these problems.
I submit that when federal courts defer to a particular branch of state
government at the expense of another branch, they infringe on State
sovereignty. The power of federal courts to review acts of Congress is a
constitutional power. Similarly, the power of state courts to review acts of
state legislatures is a matter of state constitutional power. Where the
Federal Constitution explicitly grants state legislatures particular powers, or
where the state court’s actions seem designed to evade judicial review or
frustrate a federal right, federal courts are on relatively solid ground in not
deferring to state courts. Conversely, where the Federal Constitution treats
the States as unitary entities, and where there is no indication that state
courts are working to undermine an important federal interest, federal
courts have little justification to exercise independent review of state law.
By not deferring, federal courts would essentially dictate what state
constitutional law should be. That result could nullify the power of the
people within the States to define their government and to define their
individual rights in a way more generous than that of the Federal
Constitution.
II. FEDERAL COURT APPROACHES TO STATE LAW
The Framers of our Constitution are thought to have created our federal
system of government to diffuse power, in order to guarantee the maximum
amount of individual freedom.15 The courts tend to treat our system of
federalism as dual, creating two judicial tracks in which judges have
competence over distinct subjects.16 Federal courts are considered to have
greater competence over federal law, and state courts greater competence
over state law.17 In other words, this notion of dual sovereignty suggests a
See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 4, 25 (1995) (“That the political
structure adopted in the Constitution was designed simultaneously to preserve individual liberty and to
avoid tyranny should come as no surprise to anyone reasonably well schooled in the theory of American
government.”); Robert A. Schapiro, Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in a Post-Erie World, 46
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399, 1401 (2005) (“One of the key purposes of federalism is to offer enhanced
protection for individual rights.”)(citation omitted).
16
See Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 246,
294 (2005) (describing and critiquing the theoretical model of dual federalism and its perpetuation by
courts).
17
See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSION IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 2–3 (2d
ed. 1990) (noting that federal courts are experts on national law and state courts are final interpreters of
the law of their respective jurisdictions); Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction:
15
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particular division of labor for legal issues. Federal claims and federal
issues should be heard by federal courts, and state claims and state issues
should be heard by state courts.
Unfortunately, the world does not divide up quite so nicely, and there is
significant overlap between state and federal issues. For example, state
courts are often called upon to decide issues of federal law.18 State court
competence over federal law is not entirely surprising because state courts
are courts of general jurisdiction. Bound by the Supremacy Clause, they
not only are able to decide federal questions but also have a duty to do so. 19
Of course, that competence notwithstanding, scholars disagree on whether
state courts can adequately protect federal interests.20
Allocating Cases Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1236–41 (2004)
(discussing how a sovereign’s own courts should decide questions involving that sovereign’s laws);
Schapiro, supra note 15, at 1409; see also Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional
Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 607 (1981) (describing the rhetorical tradition that holds
federal judges more competent to adjudicate federal matters); Philip B. Kurland, Professor of Law,
Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention
Doctrine, Address Before the Conference of Chief Justices (August 20, 1959), in 24 F.R.D. 481, 487
(1960) (“I start with the principle that the federal courts are the primary experts on national law just as
the State courts are the final expositors of the laws of their respective jurisdictions.”).
18
This role has always been part of the fabric of the federal judicial system, and the Madisonian
Compromise, which gave Congress the option to create lower federal courts, reflects this. MICHAEL E.
SOLIMINE & JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS: THE INEVITABILITY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 29–31
(1999). The debate at the time centered on whether the creation of lower federal courts would be
necessary to handle the broad caseload of federal cases or would instead infringe on the role of States in
deciding federal issues. Id. And, given how few cases the United States Supreme Court hears, the
States have become important guardians of federal interests. See Friedman, supra note 17, at 1218–20
(noting that caseload constraints make it impossible for the Supreme Court to review many of the state
cases involving federal questions); Robert R. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the Enforcement Gap in
Constitutional Law: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Theory that Self-Restraint Promotes
Federalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1289, 1304 (2005) (“[T]he Court has often reassured us that
federal constitutional rights will be protected because state judges would fairly consider them . . . .”);
Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L.
REV. 335, 350–53 (2002) (arguing that a decrease in the review of state court cases by the Supreme
Court “may make it difficult for federal and state lower court judges to resolve correctly or uniformly
issues of federal law”).
19
See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 443 (1977) (“‘[S]tate courts have the solemn
responsibility equally with federal courts’ to safeguard constitutional rights . . . .” (quoting Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1974))); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1946) (holding that state
courts may not discriminate against federal claims, but rather, have a duty to hear them); see also
Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS.
L. REV. 39, 49–52, 161–70 (analyzing state-court obligations not to discriminate against federal claims);
cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 757 (1999) (holding that this duty is simply not to discriminate
between state and federal claims, but that the States are not required to hear federal claims if they do not
entertain similar state claims).
20
Compare Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1131 (1977) (“[T]he only
judicial forums . . . capable of enforcing countermajoritarian checks in a sustained, effective manner are
the federal courts[,] and . . . , to the extent that constitutional cases can be shifted from federal to state
trial courts, the capacity of individuals to mount successful challenges to collective decisions will be
substantially diminished.”) with Bator, supra note 17, at 637 (“[S]tate courts will and should continue to
play a substantial role in the elaboration of federal constitutional principles.”), Erwin Chemerinsky,
Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REV. 593, 599 (1991) (“[T]he differences between federal and
state courts do not necessarily translate into decisions that are more protective of individual liberties.”),
Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV.
233, 236–37 (1988) (“[L]itigants with federal constitutional claims should generally be able to choose
the forum, federal or state, in which to resolve their disputes.”), and Michael E. Solimine & James L.
Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity ,
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As accepted as the notion of state court competence over federal issues
is, federal courts seem less competent to decide state law issues. The
mantra of modern federalism is that federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction and may only exercise the jurisdiction that the Constitution or
federal statutes grant. Thus, our first instinct might be to say that federal
courts should never decide issues of state law.21
That approach, however, is not required by the text or structure of the
Constitution.22 The Constitution extends the judicial power of the United
States to “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties[, and] . . . to Controversies”
between certain parties.23 Moreover, the appellate power of the Supreme
Court extends “both as to Law and Fact.”24 By empowering the judicial
branch to decide all cases and particular controversies, and by defining the
appellate power as allowing de novo review, the Constitution gives the
judicial branch the power to decide every issue, whether of fact or of law,
whether state or federal, as long as that issue is contained in a case or
controversy that would fall within Article III’s limits.25 Thus, under the
Constitution’s terms, federal courts likely have the power not only to
10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 214–15 (1983) (“[S]tate courts are no more ‘hostile’ to the vindication of
federal rights than are their federal counterparts, and . . . the opportunity for review by state appellate
courts and the United States Supreme Court significantly mitigates concern over the institutional
competence of state trial courts.”).
21
See Schapiro, supra note 15, at 1426–28 (postulating that only state courts have the authority to
dictate state law by interpreting it).
22
Many scholars have described the way that the federal and state governments actually work
together as “cooperative” federalism, which is not really a normative theory, but simply a description of
voluntary activity. E.g., Daniel J. Elazar, Cooperative Federalism, in COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 65, 80–83 (Daphne A. Kenyon &
John Kincaid eds., 1991); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism:
Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 815–16
(1998). John Kincaid has argued that in the late 1970s cooperative federalism was replaced by coercive
federalism when the federal government began using more coercive regulatory tools, such as
preempting state authority and presenting the states with unfunded mandates. John Kincaid, From
Cooperative to Coercive Federalism, 509 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 139, 148–49 (1990).
23
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
24
Id.
25
This is not to say that there are no constitutional limits on the review of facts found at the trialcourt level. The Seventh Amendment explicitly limits the facts a federal appellate court can review,
and the Due Process Clause may also provide some limit. See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact
Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 233–34 (1985) (noting the Seventh Amendment’s prohibition against
reexamining facts tried by a jury). Additionally, the doctrine of adequate and independent state
grounds, which provides that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction over a case that presents a federal
question if the judgment could be wholly supported on the outcome of a state-law issue, may have
constitutional foundations. The Supreme Court’s reversal of the judgment would have no effect on the
result, since the state court could issue the same judgment on state-law grounds. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324
U.S. 117, 126 (1945). The Supreme Court’s decision would be an advisory opinion. Id.; see also
Cynthia L. Fountaine, Article III and the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine , 48 AM. U.
L. REV. 1053 (1999) (arguing that the adequate-and-independent-state-law-grounds doctrine is a part of
Article III’s standing requirement). It is difficult to see, though, how what happened in Fitzgerald v.
Racing Association, where the State did just that on remand, would not be an advisory opinion in the
same way. But see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038 n.4, 1039–40 (1983) (detailing the
circumstances in which the Court will take jurisdiction, even though the judgment could be sustained on
state grounds, namely, where those grounds are not clearly the actual grounds relied on, not truly
adequate, or not truly independent).
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consider issues of state law, but also to decide them without deferring to
state-court constructions of that law.26
Not only does the text of the Constitution allow federal courts a broad
reach to decide state-law issues, the structure of the Constitution also
demonstrates that state and federal governance overlap significantly. The
federal government and the States share competence to legislate in many
areas. While some categories are truly reserved to the States, like a general
police power, and some are granted exclusively to the federal government,
like the power to grant patents, these discrete categories grow ever fewer as
our society changes and more conduct transcends State boundaries.
Because of the overlap of federal and state law, federal courts encounter
state-law questions in a number of ways.27 The most obvious situation is
when the federal court is sitting in diversity.28 In other situations, federal
courts exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims that arise
from the same nucleus of operative fact as a claim federal courts would
have jurisdiction over.29
In addition to these situations in which the state-law issues make up
discrete causes of action, questions of federal law are often intertwined
with questions of state law. For example, a federal court may consider a
federal question to which federal common law applies, and the content of
that federal common law may be state law.30 Other examples of
intertwined issues include situations when the state-law question is an
essential step in the analysis of federal law, such as when the court must
decide whether the Federal Constitution protects a right created by state
Monaghan, supra note 25, at 272–73 (arguing that the Supreme Court can use its discretion to
review the fact-finding and law application of state courts); Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court
Review of State-Court Determinations of State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919,
1967 (2003) (“[T]he Court’s historical practice provides support for the existence of an ancillary
authority to exercise independent judgment over state-law determinations in federal cases.”). But see
Friedman, supra note 17, at 1237–46 (noting the sovereignty interests that States have in state courts
interpreting and enforcing their laws and the lack of interest federal courts have in interpreting and
enforcing state laws); Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and
Federal Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1990) (arguing that “rigid readings of the text [of Article
III] fail to account for changing conceptions of the role of federal courts”).
27
See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 337–47, 358–59 (1816) (Story, J.)
(considering the federal courts’ power under Article III to review the judgments of state courts and to
examine issues of state law); see also Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 117 (1963) (per curiam)
(requiring that, on habeas review of state criminal proceedings, federal courts defer to state-court
findings of fact unless they “are not ‘fairly supported by the record’” (quoting Act of June 25, 1948, ch.
646, § 2254, 62 Stat. 869, 967, repealed by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1218 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (2000)))).
28
The Constitution grants federal courts jurisdiction over “Controversies . . . between Citizens of
different States.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Congress gave that jurisdiction to the lower federal courts as
well. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000).
29
28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000). When federal jurisdiction is based on diversity, there is no
supplemental jurisdiction over parties that would destroy that diversity. Id. § 1367(b). However, only
one party needs to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction, so there will
be supplemental jurisdiction over diverse parties that do not satisfy the amount-in-controversy
requirement as long as one party does satisfy it. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S.
546, 549 (2005).
30
E.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001) (involving the time
bar of a claim brought in the district courts of two different states); United States v. Kimbell Foods, 440
U.S. 715, 739–40 (1979) (involving the prioritization of public and private liens on property).
26
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law31 or when a federal statute confers a benefit or puts a burden on a class
of people defined by state law.32 A third category of these state-lawantecedent situations occurs when federal courts evaluate the
constitutionality of state laws.
The analysis that follows will refer to state law as if it were a single,
concrete concept. This is an oversimplification used to clarify a very
murky area. In fact, state law issues may come to federal courts in a
number of ways. State law may be contained in a statute never interpreted
by any state court, or it may be contained in a statute that a state court
interpreted at some point in an unrelated, prior proceedings. Conversely,
the law may have been made entirely through state common law. Finally,
the issue may come to the Supreme Court by direct review, and to the
lower courts on certain limited kinds of collateral review, as a direct
interpretation of the state law at issue by a state court applying that law to
the exact factual context the federal court faces. The source and nature of
the state law will make a difference in how federal courts should interpret
and apply that law.
This Article also discusses the state courts’ prior actions as if they were
uniform, and that too is an oversimplification. For purposes of this
discussion, state-law determinations could range from pure questions of
law, like what law applies, to “mixed” questions of law and fact, or the
application of the law to the facts.33 Both categories of decisions may be

31

This describes, generally, procedural due process cases. The Constitution prohibits the
government from depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S.
CONST. amend. V (applying to the federal government); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (applying to the States).
The first step in a procedural due process case is, generally, to decide whether there is a property or
liberty interest that the law protects, and usually that interest is created by state law. Bd. of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
32
A well-known example is the Internal Revenue Code, which determines taxable income on the
basis of whether an individual is married, but does not define how a person becomes married. See 26
U.S.C. § 1 (2000 & Supp. III 2003); cf. id. § 7703 (providing rules that govern when in time a person is
considered married, if that person has had a change in marital status; certain married people living apart
will not be considered married under the statutory definition). The Federal Defense of Marriage Act
provides another limit on the definition of marriage, providing that, for federal purposes, marriage is
any “legal union between one man and one woman,” but not defining what a legal union is. 1 U.S.C.
§ 7 (2000).
A similar issue is present when state law incorporates a federal-law issue, such as when state tort
law provides that violation of a federal regulation constitutes negligence per se, or when a state tax code
defines taxable income as the income defined as taxable by the Internal Revenue Code. See Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 816 & n.14 (1986) (affirming in dicta that the
Supreme Court would have appellate jurisdiction over the federal question posed in the former example,
but holding that normally the issue would not present a federal question before the lower federal courts
as their statutory “arising under” jurisdiction has been interpreted (quoting Moore v. Chesapeake &
Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205, 214–15 (1934))).
33
This Article does not touch on the amount of deference to be given to lower court findings of fact.
For a discussion of that issue, see Monaghan, supra note 25, at 236–38. Although some courts and
scholars assert that the different types of questions are discrete, they are more properly viewed as being
on a continuum. Id. at 233. Professors Allen and Pardo argue that there is no defensible distinction
between these types of questions, and that questions of law are simply different types of fact questions.
Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769
(2003).
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reviewed de novo, but the more fact-intensive the question, the more the
courts may choose to grant some deference to the lower courts.34

A. Rules Providing Deference to State-Court Determinations
The propriety of federal courts considering state law has been addressed
in several different situations, with fairly consistent results. In 1875, in the
context of review of state court decisions, the Supreme Court examined
whether to review issues of state law in state high-court cases when those
state-law issues were distinct from the federal-law issues.35 The Court
determined that, under the jurisdictional statutes, it could review all of the
federal issues, but that the holdings of the state court on issues of state law
could not be reviewed.36 This principle lies beneath the rule that the
Supreme Court will not exercise jurisdiction over a case in which a federal
issue is present, even if that issue was wrongly decided by the state court, if
the judgment in the case rests on “adequate and independent state
grounds.”37
Similar to the rules developed for Supreme Court review of state court
decisions, federal courts encountering state issues must often defer to statecourt declarations of law. By statute, federal courts sitting in diversity
must follow state constitutional, statutory, and common law.38 Thus, when
Compare Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123–26 (2000) (applying de novo review to a
determination of reasonable suspicion), Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 136–37 (1999) (opinion of
Stevens, J., joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.) (stating that fact-intensive issues of
constitutional law require de novo review), and Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996)
(using de novo review because law “acquire[s] content only through application”), with Lilly, 527 U.S.
at 148 (5-4 decision) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the question’s fact-intensive nature
warranted deference), Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing for deference), and
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 176 (1983) (deferring to application of law
to the facts on whether corporate activities constituted a unitary business). But see Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (holding that in First Amendment cases the
Court must exercise de novo review of the law and facts).
35
Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 614–15 (1875); see also Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 392 (1798) (holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide whether state
statutes are valid under state constitutional law).
36
Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 632–33. This principle is so firmly established that, in Ring v.
Arizona, the Supreme Court deferred to an Arizona Supreme Court’s refusal to follow the U.S.
Supreme Court’s prior interpretation of an Arizona death penalty statute. 536 U.S. 584, 603 (2002).
However, some scholars have argued that Congress did intend to give the Supreme Court the power to
review holdings in state court decisions because, after the Civil War, Congress fundamentally distrusted
the state courts. Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal
Jurisdictional Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 1291, 1319–20 (1986).
37
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1983).
38
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71–80 (1938) (interpreting the Rules of Decision Act,
ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000))). The holding in
Erie rested, in part, on perceived constitutional limitations. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth
of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 703 (1974) (“[N]othing in the Constitution provided the central
government with a general lawmaking authority of the sort the Court had been exercising . . . .”); Paul J.
Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie: The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 1683 (1974) (“That
Congress may have constitutional power to make federal law displacing state substantive policy does
not imply an equal range of power for federal judges.”). Some scholars have cast doubt on these
principles as constitutionally required. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 326 (5th ed. 2007)
(“The constitutional basis for the Erie decision has confounded scholars.” (citing Ely, supra; Stewart
34
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the State’s highest court has declared what the law is, federal courts must
follow that determination when deciding diversity cases.
Similar to the adequate-and-independent-state-grounds threshold for
Supreme Court review of state court decisions, lower federal courts may
abstain entirely from considering cases in certain circumstances when state
law is unclear.39 For the court to abstain in constitutional cases, the state
law must be substantially uncertain, and there must be a reasonable
possibility that the state court’s clarification will resolve the issue so that
the court need not reach the constitutional issue.40 In diversity cases, the
state-law issue must be unclear and the case must involve some important
state interest that is part of the State’s unique power as sovereign, like
eminent domain.41 Similarly, in federal-question cases in which the issue is
regulated by a complex state administrative process designed to treat
uniformly an essentially local problem, federal courts may defer to the state
process rather than issue injunctive relief.42
Short of abstention, special rules of construction have been developed
that embody deference to the states for cases in which federal courts must
interpret state laws that have been challenged as violating the Federal
Constitution.43 Statutes, even those enacted by states, are presumed to be
constitutional, and a challenger bears the burden of demonstrating that a
statute violates the Constitution.44 Where the challenge is that the law is
unconstitutionally vague, it must be vague in all of its applications, not
merely unclear in some instances.45 And where a statute might seem on its
Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law (pt. 2), 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231 (1985); and Martin H. Redish &
Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma , 91
HARV. L. REV. 356 (1977))).
39
See La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27–29 (1959) (abstaining to allow
the state court to decide an unclear issue of state law of great local importance); Ala. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n v. S. Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 345, 349–50 (1951) (deferring to “state court review of an
administrative scheme based on predominantly local factors”); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315,
332 (1943) (deferring to the state court regarding a complex state regulatory scheme); R.R. Comm’n v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499–501 (1941) (abstaining to allow a state court to determine a state-law
issue that would be dispositive to a constitutional claim).
40
See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 54 (1973) (stating that abstention is appropriate “where the
challenged state statute is susceptible of a construction by the state judiciary that would avoid or modify
the necessity of reaching a federal constitutional question”); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375–78 &
n.11 (1959) (declining abstention where the state statutory question could not dispose of the federal
constitutional issue).
41
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 28; see also Allegheny County v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185,
191–96 (1959) (holding that abstention was not appropriate where there were no “exceptional
circumstances” or “important countervailing interest”).
42
See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 728–30 (1996) (holding that abstention on
administrative-process and local-problem grounds is only appropriate in cases of discretionary relief);
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 364 (1989) (limiting abstention
to situations that would substantially interfere with administration of an essentially local program).
43
These ideologically neutral rules of construction have been called “quasi-constitutional law,” and
can be used by the Court in a very sophisticated way to promote a number of values, including
ideological ones, through its decision making. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, QuasiConstitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992).
44
Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 198 (2001) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 944 (1983)).
45
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 121 n.50 (1972) (citing Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 91 (1965)).
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face to violate the Constitution, if the state court has given the statute a
narrower construction that would be constitutional, that construction will
be upheld.46

B. Rules Providing Less Deference to State Courts
Federal courts will not always defer to state-court determinations,
however. Even in the diversity context, federal courts have some flexibility
to interpret state law. If a State’s highest court has not spoken on the issue,
federal courts are not required to certify a question to that court. Nor do
federal courts have to defer to the State’s appellate courts, unless federal
courts are convinced that the state supreme court would agree. In other
words, federal courts are allowed to predict how the state supreme court
would decide the issue.47
Additionally, there are many situations in the state-law-antecedent cases
where federal courts will interpret what state law means, even if the federal
court also gives some amount deference to a state-court interpretation.
State law is antecedent to a federal issue when the “existence, application
or implementation of a federal right turns on the resolution of a logically
antecedent issue of state law.”48 When the federal right depends in this way
on an issue of state law, federal courts have the ability and the duty to
decide what impact the state law will have on the federal law.49 That
impact is actually a federal question, and not really interpretation of state
law at all, even though the federal-court analysis may look as if the federal
court is interpreting the state law.50 Moreover, even in a state-lawantecedent case in which the state court construction of the issue would
resolve the matter and preclude consideration of the federal question, the
federal court may still need to review the state law to some extent, to
ensure, at the least, that the law is not being construed to impair federal
interests.51 As a practical matter, the Supreme Court will often interpret
state law, rather than remand the matter to the State’s highest court for
46

Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, 452–53 (2005) (per curiam) (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.
639, 654 (1990), overruled on other grounds, Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)). Not exactly a rule
of construction, is the related doctrine of constitutional avoidance. It is an approach that is less
deferential to the States than abstention, but is similar. A federal court can decide a case based on a
pendent state-law claim if doing so avoids the case’s constitutional issue; it need not refer to the State
for decision. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 192–93 (1909). This approach
still affords the State significant deference by not calling the state law into constitutional question, and
it avoids some of the problems posed by abstention, such as delay and increased cost.
47
CHARLES WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL COURTS § 58, at 396 (6th ed. 2002). Additionally,
the Supreme Court has traditionally deferred to the findings of lower federal courts regarding the law of
a State within their jurisdiction. Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 167 (1998) (“[There is
a] presumption of deference given the views of a federal court as to the law of a State within its
jurisdiction.”). Deference is not warranted, however, if State expertise would not be warranted in
interpreting the state law. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 757 (2005) (overturning
lower court’s interpretation of state law where it “did not draw upon a deep well of state-specific
expertise”).
48
Herbert Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law and
Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043, 1054 (1977).
49
Monaghan, supra note 26, at 1925–26, 1935–47.
50
Id. (analyzing the issue primarily in the context of constitutional cases, and referring to this as
“characterization” of the issue for federal-law purposes).
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interpretation, when it must determine whether a right under a state statute
was unconstitutionally denied,52 or when the state statute itself is
unconstitutional.53
When a state court has spoken on the issue, the Supreme Court usually
looks only far enough into the issue of state law to see whether the decision
of the state court “rests upon a fair or substantial basis. . . . [I]f there is no
evasion of the constitutional issue, and the nonfederal ground of decision
has fair support, [the] Court will not . . . substitute its own view of what
should be deemed the better rule. . . .”54 This fair-support rule applies
generally to state-law-antecedent issues.
However, the Supreme Court does not always follow the fair-support
rule. For example, in Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand the issue before
the Court was whether a teacher had a vested contract right that could not
be impaired under the Constitution’s Contract Clause.55 The Indiana
Supreme Court had ruled that she had no contract under Indiana law, but
the Supreme Court maintained the authority to address the question
directly:
On such a question, one primarily of state law, we accord respectful
consideration and great weight to the views of the State’s highest court but, in
order that the constitutional mandate may not become a dead letter, we are
bound to decide for ourselves whether a contract was made, what are its terms
and conditions, and whether the State has, by later legislation, impaired its
obligation. This involves an appraisal of the statutes of the State and the
decisions of its courts.56

The Supreme Court determined that, contrary to the Indiana Supreme
Court’s finding, the Indiana statutory scheme and the State’s actions under
it created a contract between the teacher and the State that was protected
under the Federal Constitution’s Contract Clause.57
51

RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
498 (5th ed. 2003); Laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: Supreme Court Review of State-Court
State-Law Judgments, 101 MICH. L. REV. 80, 83–85 (2002) (“[T]he Court routinely claims the power to
review a state-law decision that blocked a state court from considering a federal claim . . . .”).
52
See Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938) (affording the state court some
deference but ultimately deciding for itself whether a contract was made and, if so, whether the State
failed to honor the contract).
53
See Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 482 (1942) (“Since validity of the state statute as
construed was drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, we think the
case is properly here on appeal . . . .”).
54
Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina ex rel. Daniel, 281 U.S. 537, 540–41 (1930).
55
303 U.S. 95, 96–99 (1938). For the Constitution’s Contract Clause, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
56
Brand, 303 U.S. at 100 (internal citation omitted).
57
Id. at 105, 108–09. One possible interpretation of the holding is that, rather than deciding the
issue as a matter of state law, the Court was deciding the federal effect of the state laws, an issue of
federal, not state law. See General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 187 (1992) (“The question
whether a contract was made is a federal question for purposes of Contract Clause analysis, and
‘whether it turns on issues of general or purely local law, we cannot surrender the duty to exercise our
own judgment.’” (internal citation omitted) (quoting Appleby v. City of N.Y., 271 U.S. 364, 380
(1926))). Professors Monaghan and Fallon argue that the Due Process Clause has some core conception
of liberty and property, defined as matters of federal law, that state law must satisfy, but state law rarely
fails to satisfy those thresholds. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial
Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 327–29 (1993); Henry Paul Monaghan,
Of “Liberty” and “Property,” 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 440 (1977); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472, 484–86 (1995) (holding that state law mandating certain procedures to follow before a prison
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Even though the Supreme Court found no evasion of the constitutional
issue, the Court did not evaluate whether the state court’s interpretation of
state law had fair support.58 Thus, federal supremacy may sometimes
provide a basis for federal courts to deviate from the normal rules of
deference.

C. Unifying the Two Approaches
This review of deference rules reveals that the amount of deference that
federal courts afford the states ranges from total abstention from even
considering a case to de novo review of state law. The rules that have
emerged are pragmatic and balance State autonomy against federal
interests.59 Essentially, the traditional rule has embodied a dualist federal
approach: federal courts review issues of federal law, and state high court
determinations are final on issues of state law.60 While this is generally
true, federal courts are less likely to defer or affirmatively ask the State to
interpret a state law when faced with a state-law-antecedent situation.
This description of the federal-court approach to state-law issues
demonstrates that, in practice, the decisions of the federal court can appear
ad hoc and result-oriented. And when judicial federalism cases are
compared to other cases considering legislative federalism, the federal
courts’ approach seems even more confusing. The Supreme Court appears
to sometimes promote States’ rights and to sometimes expand national
power, without consistency.
Most recently, the Rehnquist Court seemed to breathe new life into
state power by limiting Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, while also strengthening the
Tenth and Eleventh Amendments. In United States v. Lopez61 in 1995 and
United States v. Morrison62 in 2000, for the first time since 1937, the Court
struck down legislation as beyond Congress’s Commerce Clause power.63
inmate could be disciplined did not by itself create a liberty interest; only a sentence that “imposes
atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” would
impair an inmate’s limited liberty interest).
58
The Court may have implicitly made this fair-support analysis by considering prior rulings by the
Indiana Supreme Court. See Brand, 303 U.S. at 107.
59
The rules could actually promote an ideological purpose of the Court, rather than a neutral
federalism purpose. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, The Three Faces of Federalism: An
Empirical Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence , 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 741, 745–46
(2000).
60
See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 626 (1875) (deeming state courts the
“appropriate tribunals” for state-law questions).
61
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (considering the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647,
§ 1702, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844–45), superseded by statute, Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 320904, 108 Stat. 1796, 2125–26.
62
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (considering the Civil Rights Remedies for Gender-Motivated Violence Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1902, 1941–42 (1994)).
63
See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2004). Since
Morrison, the Court seems to have stepped back from this states’-rights jurisprudence. In Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 12–22 (2005), the Court upheld the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 801–904 (2000), as valid Commerce Clause legislation that preempted California’s Compassionate
Use Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West Supp. 2007). The Compassionate Use Act had
allowed individuals to grow small amounts of marijuana for their own use when a doctor recommended
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In City of Boerne v. Flores,64 the Court limited Congress’s power to create
legislative rights broader than the constitutional rights the Fourteenth
Amendment created.65 That decision was applied to broaden the reach of
the Eleventh Amendment, limiting Congress’s ability to subject the States
to suits for money damages.66 Using the Tenth Amendment, as well, the
Court during this time period limited federal power in New York v. United
States67 and Printz v. United States.68 The Court has also taken a restrictive
view of federal power in habeas corpus jurisdiction69 and civil rights
cases.70

the drug for serious medical conditions. Id. In its most recent decision on the topic, the Court avoided
the federalism issue in a case involving the executive branch’s attempts to preempt the Oregon Death
with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.800–.897 (West Supp. 1998), which allows doctors to
prescribe drugs to help terminally ill patients commit suicide, by finding that Congress failed to give the
executive branch the power to prohibit doctors from prescribing these drugs. Gonzales v. Oregon, 126
S. Ct. 904, 916–22 (2006).
64
521 U.S. 507 (1997), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2000).
65
See id. at 519–20, 536 (holding that, while Congress has broad authority under the Constitution to
adopt legislation to protect Fourteenth Amendment rights, the Court retains the right to determine
whether such legislation amounts to an abuse of authority under the Constitution).
66
For examples of cases in which the requirements were not met for private individuals to recover
money damages against the States, see Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666 (1999); and Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999). The Eleventh Amendment was strengthened in this way by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44 (1996), in which the Court held that Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity only under
its Fourteenth Amendment powers. Id. at 57–60. Not only are States immune from suit in federal
court, but Congress cannot subject them to suit in their own courts either. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 730–54 (1999). For a thorough analysis of this Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, see Marcia L.
McCormick, Federalism Re-Constructed: The Eleventh Amendment’s Illogical Impact on Congress’
Power, 37. IND. L. REV. 345 (2004).
As in the Commerce Clause context, the Court seems to be stepping back here as well. Four cases
in the last three years have upheld Congress’s power. In Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), the Court held that Congress had the power under the Fourteenth
Amendment to enact the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–54 (2000). In
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004), the Court upheld Title II of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–65 (2000), as a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity, at least as far as
it mandated access to courthouses and other functions of government. Then, in two bankruptcy cases,
Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004), and Central Virginia Community
College v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990 (2006), the Court held that Congress could subject the State to suit for
in-rem bankruptcy proceedings under its Article I bankruptcy powers.
67
505 U.S. 144, 174–77 (1992) (holding that Congress could not coerce State governments into
either accepting ownership of radioactive waste or implementing legislation dictated by Congress).
68
521 U.S. 898, 925–33 (1997) (overturning Congress’s mandate that local law enforcement
conduct background checks on applicants for gun permits as commandeering).
69
E.g., Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 318 (1995) (expressing concern that habeas filings threatened
the finality of state court judgments, implicating comity and federalism), superseded by statute,
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101, 105, 106, 110
Stat. 1214, 1217, 1220 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2255 (2000)).
70
E.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 476–85 (1996) (holding that preclearance
under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2000), cannot be denied simply
because a jurisdiction’s voting procedures violate section 2 of the Act, id. § 1973); Growe v. Emison,
507 U.S. 25, 32 (1993) (recognizing that, even though federal and state courts may have concurrent
jurisdiction over particular subject matter, there are circumstances in which federalism and comity
concerns dictate federal abstention). But see Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1069 (1996) (5-4 decision)
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Currently, in all but the Tenth Amendment context, the Court has issued
subsequent decisions that elevate federal interests above states rights.71
Furthermore, at the same time that it issued the strong states’-rights
decisions described above, the Court also issued decisions that extend the
national power in other areas.72
Taken as a whole, then, the Court’s federalism decisions seem
inconsistent and ideologically based.73 The following section of this
Article seeks to divine some nonideological guiding principles that federal
courts can draw on to explain the level of deference they give to States in
state-law issues.
III. FEDERAL CONSIDERATION OF STATE-LEVEL INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE
There is a spectrum of options available to federal courts encountering
state-court determinations of state law. At one end of the spectrum, federal
courts would abstain from hearing cases that involved issues of state law,
or they would consider the cases but not consider the state-law issues at all,
instead deferring entirely to any state determination of what the law means
or how it should be applied to these facts. At the other end of the spectrum,
federal courts would review every issue of law or fact de novo, with no
deference to any prior holdings by state courts either in the case before the
federal court or in a prior, unrelated proceeding that would be precedential
in state court.
While all of the cases fall along this continuum, federal courts rarely
explain what reasoning underlies their decisions to defer or not. A great
number of the variances from the usual rule of deference can be explained,
however, by notions of institutional competency: federal courts are
deferring to the State institution that they perceive to be most competent to
perform the task at issue or not deferring where the particular State
institution lacks special competency.
Federal-court discourse has long incorporated the concept of
institutional competence, usually under the principle of separation of
powers. That notion has nearly always been articulated when federal
(Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the plurality opinion for going too far in limiting State discretion
under the Voting Rights Act).
71
See supra notes 63, 66.
72
E.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 112–16 (2000) (holding that state laws governing
design standards for oil tankers were preempted by federal law); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v.
Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 575–88 (1997) (striking down a state tax incentive on Dormant
Commerce Clause grounds); Morales v. TWA, 504 U.S. 374, 387–91 (1992) (finding a state law
regarding airline-fare advertising preempted by federal statute). There have been a large number of
preemption cases in recent years, some expanding the scope of federal power and some not. For a full
discussion of these preemption cases in a functional analysis, see Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick,
Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43,
47 (2006), and Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 1353, 1365–98 (2006).
73
See Cross & Tiller, supra note 59, at 757–62, 768; David Niven & Kenneth W. Miller,
Federalism by Convenience: The Supreme Court’s Judicial Federalists on the Death Penalty and
States’ Rights Controversies, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 567 (2005); see also Jackson, Narratives, supra note 3,
at 280 (arguing that the Court’s record on protection of State power from federal encroachment is
suspect).
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courts employ it in a horizontal fashion, that is, when determining whether
the federal judicial branch, Congress, or the President is more properly
suited for a particular task. Occasionally, though, state-level institutional
competence has been the explicit focus of federal courts. Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s concurrence in Bush v. Gore74 is the most famous, or
infamous, example.
This Part analyzes the cases in which the Supreme Court has not
deferred to state-court interpretations of state law, with a particular focus
on those cases in which the Court has explicitly deferred to the state
legislative branch. As part of this analysis, I distinguish between two kinds
of state court decisions: interpretations of what a statute means; and
discernment of what the purpose of a state law is. The distinction has
important implications.
In either context, I submit that, because the Federal Constitution rarely
differentiates between the branches of state government, federal courts
have little justification for doing so. Ultimately, deciding which branch of
state government should have primacy over any particular issue is a matter
of state constitutional law. In other words, just as federal judicial review is
part of the federal courts’ constitutional power, the interpretation of state
law is simply an exercise of the state courts’ state-constitutional power. As
such, the determination of the proper balance of that power should be up to
each State.

A. Independent Review in State Courts’ Interpretations of the Meaning or
Content of State Law
In only a few cases has the Supreme Court admitted to engaging in
independent review of the meaning of state law and of rejecting the state
court’s interpretation of that law, and each of those instances was in service
to the supremacy of an important and substantive federal right or
enumerated power. In Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Lessee, for example,
the Supreme Court indepentendly reviewed Virginia law to determine the
proper title to land, because the state-law issues were antecedent to
deciding what rights the putative owner had under federal treaties.75 State
hostility to the role of the Supreme Court and the supremacy of federal law
at the time of the Fairfax case may have made such rejection necessary.76
Born out of similar resistance to federal authority, the Supreme Court’s
decisions in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson77 and Bouie v. City of
74

For more information on Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence, see supra notes 7–8 and accompanying

text.
75

11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 618–28 (1813). The Court explained its reasoning for deciding in this
manner in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 357–58 (1816).
76
See Bush v Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 140 (2000) (per curiam) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing how
Fairfax “occurred amidst vociferous States’ rights attacks on the Marshall Court” (citing GERALD
GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 61–62 (13th ed. 1997))). This hostility was
based, at least in part, on State hostility to British creditors after the Revolutionary War. See Wythe
Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal
Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1438–49 (discussing specific legal actions by States to prevent British
creditors from recovering debts after the Revolutionary War).
77
357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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Columbia78 rejected state-supreme-court deviations from prior state law
when those deviations themselves violated due process.79 Even before
State resistance to federal enforcement of civil rights, in Indiana ex rel.
Anderson v. Brand, the Supreme Court rejected the Indiana Supreme
Court’s construction of state law where that construction could have
arguably deprived a teacher of property without due process of law.80
Conversely, in most instances in which a state court is interpreting what
a state statute means, federal courts will defer to that state court’s
interpretation.81 But this is not always the case. The most controversial
example is Bush v. Gore, in which a majority of the Supreme Court ordered
an end to a recount of ballots cast in the 2000 presidential election. 82 The
majority held that no constitutionally permissible recount could be
accomplished by a deadline that gave the States a “safe-harbor,” even
though the Florida Supreme Court was given no opportunity to determine
whether the legislature intended to meet this deadline in situations like the
one presented.83 Rather than remand to the Florida Supreme Court to order
that the recount proceed in a method consistent with Florida’s election law,
the Supreme Court held that no constitutional method could complete the
recount in time to comply with what the Court interpreted the election law
to require.84
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence went further. In it he argued that
the Florida Supreme Court misinterpreted Florida election law when it
ordered the recount and, thus, impermissibly thwarted the will of the
Florida Legislature.85 As a precursor to this conclusion, the Chief Justice
argued that the United States Supreme Court had a duty under Article II of
the United States Constitution, which assigns the power to direct the
appointment of electors to the legislatures of the States, to ensure that the
state judicial branch was faithful to the will of the state legislative branch.86
He explained that given this federal constitutional duty, the review and
rejection of the state court interpretation of state law “does not imply a
78

378 U.S. 347 (1964).
Id. at 350, 362 (“We think it clear that the South Carolina Supreme Court, in applying its new
construction of the statute to affirm these convictions, has deprived petitioners of rights guaranteed to
them by the Due Process Clause.”); Patterson, 357 U.S. at 455, 457–58 (“Novelty in [state] procedural
requirements cannot be permitted to thwart review in this Court applied for by those who, in justified
reliance upon prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their federal constitutional rights.”).
80
303 U.S. 95, 108–10 (1938). The Court may have based its decision on the fact that the Indiana
Supreme Court had changed its interpretation of state law in holding that Brand did not have a contract.
Id. at 107. Thus, Brand may be completely analogous to Martin, Bouie, and Patterson. For a detailed
discussion of Brand, see infra Part II.B.
81
See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997) (“Neither this Court nor any other federal
tribunal has any authority to place a construction on a state statute different from the one rendered by
the highest court of the state.”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (holding the state
court’s interpretation of a local ordinance binding); United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs,
402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971) (plurality opinion, in a part joined by five justices) (“[W]e lack jurisdiction
authoritatively to construe state legislation.”); see also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 483 (1993)
(contrasting interpretation of a state statute with conclusions about what effect the statute has).
82
531 U.S. 98, 105–11 (2000) (per curiam).
83
Id. at 110–11.
84
Id. at 111.
85
Id. at 116–22 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
86
Id. at 111–13 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
79
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disrespect for state courts but rather a respect for the constitutionally
prescribed role of state legislatures.”87
Thus, where state courts are suspected of undermining the supremacy of
the federal government as an institution, depriving an individual of a
federal constitutional right, or otherwise violating an express provision of
the Constitution, federal courts will not defer to those courts.88

B. Independent Review in the Statutory-Purpose Context
Another, less-analyzed area is state-court declarations of the purpose of
legislation. The purpose of legislation or of other government action is an
important consideration in First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment
constitutional analysis, as well as Dormant Commerce Clause analysis. In
these contexts, the courts apply varying levels of scrutiny, based on the
type of legislation at issue and the interest at stake. These levels of scrutiny
embody varying levels of deference to the States. Some types of
restrictions and classifications are simply not allowed. For example, in the
Establishment Clause context, the government may not impose a
requirement or restriction on individuals for a religious purpose.89 Other
restrictions and classifications are given strict scrutiny: the law must be the
least restrictive means to achieve a compelling state interest. 90 Still others
receive intermediate scrutiny: the law must be substantially related to an
important state interest.91 The vast majority of legislation receives rationalbasis review: the law must be rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose.92
For strict and intermediate scrutiny, the State bears the burden of
demonstrating that the purpose of the legislation is to promote the right

Id. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Laura S. Fitzgerald has argued that these should be the only times that federal courts should fail
to defer to state court interpretations of state law. Fitzgerald, supra note 51, at 89, 91–99.
89
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (holding that statutes related to religion
must have a secular legislative purpose, have “principal or primary effect . . . that neither advances nor
inhibits religion,” and “must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion’” (quoting
Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970))).
90
See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273–74 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(holding that differential treatment on the basis of race can only be upheld where it is justified by a
“compelling governmental interest” and is “narrowly tailored” to meet that goal (quoting Palmore v.
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984), and Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1980) (plurality
opinion), overruled on other grounds, Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1980))).
91
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534 (1996) (holding that Virginia did not show
an important enough interest in maintaining its single-sex military academy).
92
See, e.g., Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993) (applying rational-basis review
to Kentucky statutes that required different standards of evidence for involuntary commitment based on
mental retardation and mental illness). Justice O’Connor has suggested that there should be an even
lower threshold for invalidating state legislation under the Commerce Clause than the standard used
under the Due Process Clause because a federal court decision on Commerce Clause grounds may be
overcome more easily by the legislature. ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho St. Tax Comm’n, 458 U.S. 307, 350
n.14 (1982) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Richard A. Cordray & James T. Vradelis, Comment,
The Emerging Jurisprudence of Justice O’Connor, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 389, 419 (1985) (noting that
Justice O’Connor’s ASARCO footnote might have far-reaching implications for federal court deference
to state statutes that are suspect under the Due Process Clause).
87
88
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kind of governmental interest.93 For rational-basis review, on the other
hand, the burden is on the challenger to demonstrate either that there is no
legitimate governmental interest or that there is no rational relationship
between the interest and the means chosen by the legislature.94 The
legislature need not articulate that purpose, and if it does not, the courts
will evaluate whether any plausible legitimate purpose could be behind the
legislation.95 This test is not completely boundless, however: the
legislature must have been able to reasonably consider the legislative facts
before it to be true.96 Still, those facts need not actually be true; that
legislative facts turn out to be mistaken is not a reason to reject a purpose
based on those facts.97
The Supreme Court has stated that it affords deference to state court
declarations of purpose similar, if not quite at the same level, to that which
it affords interpretations of meaning.98 For example, in United States Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, the Court stated, “[w]e must, of course, accept the
state court’s view of the purpose of its own law . . . .”99 Similarly, in Allen
v. Illinois, both the majority and the dissent agreed that the state court was
the authority on both the meaning and purpose of state law.100 In fact, the
rules that the Supreme Court has developed will sometimes lead to greater
deference to findings of purpose. For example, the Supreme Court has held
that the purpose of a state law is a question of fact,101 and that the parties
See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532–33 (stating that, in intermediate scrutiny cases, the State bears the
burden of showing an important governmental objective and that the means are substantiallly related to
that objective); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922 (1995) (holding that, in the strict scrutiny context,
the State may not simply assert that the interest to be served is compelling and the means narrowly
tailored, but must provide strong evidence of it).
94
See Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 109 (2003) (explaining that the
burden is on the challenging party in such cases to “‘negative every conceivable basis’ that might
support different treatment” (quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940))).
95
See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992) (stating that rational-basis analysis
“require[s] that a purpose may conceivably or ‘may reasonably have been the purpose and policy’ of the
relevant governmental decisionmaker” (quoting Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522,
528–29 (1959))).
96
Id. at 11 (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981)).
97
Clover Leaf, 449 U.S. at 464 (“Where there was evidence before the legislature reasonably
supporting classification, litigants may not procure invalidation of the legislation merely by tendering
evidence in court that the legislature was mistaken.”).
98
This qualification was noted by Justice Breyer in his dissent in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S.
346, 383–84 (1997) (5-4 decision) (Breyer, J., dissenting), although it is not made explicit in the cases
that he cites.
99
514 U.S. 779, 829 (1995).
100
478 U.S. 364, 367 (5-4 decision) (1986) (accepting the state court’s interpretation of purpose, but
also analyzing the statute); accord id. at 380 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the State is the final
authority on both meaning and purpose, but disagreeing with the effect of the statute).
101
See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005) (treating the question of the purpose
of a government action, eminent domain, as a question of fact); Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527,
543–44 (1982) (treating the question of legislative intent as one of fact). Although the law at issue in
Crawford was a proposition amending the California Constitution, the Supreme Court did not indicate
that the type of state law made a difference in the analysis. It does not seem that a statute’s purpose
should be treated more like a question of law. Certainly state-court interpretations of the meaning of
state constitutional provisions should be given enormous deference: because those constitutions
embody a particularly sovereign interest, the state courts are uniquely situated to interpret that meaning,
and federal courts are not competent to second-guess the state courts, except in extremely rare
circumstances. However, the issue here is not one of meaning, but rather one of purpose, which is more
93

1204037116.DOC

20

2/26/2008 2/26/2008

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 9:5

may present evidence on the subject.102 Questions of fact are routinely
afforded high levels of deference.103
Despite these assertions, the Supreme Court has rejected state-court
findings of purpose in several cases. In the Establishment Clause context,
the Court has stated that, “[w]hile the Court is normally deferential to a
State’s articulation of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement of
such purpose be sincere and not a sham.”104 Because Establishment Clause
cases warrant a very searching review, this result seems analogous to those
cases involving meaning where the Court suspected state courts of evading
Supreme Court review.
In the context of rational-basis review as well, though, the Supreme
Court has rejected state-court findings of purpose. In Allegheny Pittsburgh
Coal Co. v. County Commission, both state statute and the constitution
provided that property tax valuation be based on a particular criterion. 105
The Supreme Court rejected a state-court finding that the legislature could
have intended to allow valuation based on a different and incompatible
criterion.106
In these examples the Supreme Court rejected expansive state-court
interpretations of purpose meant to find state legislation legitimate, but, in
at least two recent cases, the Court has also rejected the limiting
interpretations of purpose state courts have used to strike down legislation.
like a historical fact than is the slippery notion of group intent.
102
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938) (“Where the existence of a
rational basis for legislation whose constitutionality is attacked depends upon facts beyond the sphere of
judicial notice, such facts may properly be made the subject of judicial inquiry” (citing Borden’s Farm
Prods. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194 (1934))). It is not enough to provide evidence that the legislature
was mistaken, however:
[Parties challenging legislation] cannot prevail so long as “it is evident from all the
considerations presented to [the legislature], and those of which we may take judicial notice,
that the question is at least debatable.” Where there was evidence before the legislature
reasonably supporting the classification, litigants may not procure invalidation of the legislation
merely by tendering evidence in court that the legislature was mistaken.
Clover Leaf, 449 U.S. at 464 (alterations in Clover Leaf) (quoting Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 154).
This is not the type of proof at issue in Fitzgerald or Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997),
discussed infra notes 108–130 and accompanying text. Those cases concerned evidence of what the
legislature considered and intended, not of the validity of the facts before the legislature.
103
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (stating that “[f]indings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous”).
104
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586–87 (1987) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 64
(1985) (Powell, J., concurring)); see also Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 75 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing
that the secular-purpose requirement is meaningful because “our courts are capable of distinguishing a
sham secular purpose from a sincere one”); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam)
(holding that the avowed secular purpose of a statute would not blind the Court when the statute had a
plainly religious nature); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223–24 (1963) (holding that
the implementation of a purportedly secular practice made clear its religious nature).
105
488 U.S. 336, 345 (1989).
106
Id. at 345; see also Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1992) (distinguishing another unequal
tax assessment on the basis that “Allegheny Pittsburgh was the rare case where the facts precluded any
plausible inference that the reason for the unequal assessment practice was to achieve the benefits of an
acquisition-value tax scheme”). In another situation in which the Supreme Court defended its decision
to construe purpose broadly, the Court distinguished a prior case that had not construed purpose
broadly. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959) (distinguishing Wheeling
Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 572 (1949), by stating, “[h]aving themselves specifically declared
their purpose, the Ohio statutes left no room to conceive of any other purpose for their existence”).
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In Kansas v. Hendricks,107 a Kansas man challenged the State’s Sexually
Violent Predator Act,108 arguing, among other things, that it was a punitive
statute that violated the federal constitutional prohibitions against double
jeopardy and ex post facto laws.109 The Supreme Court treated the question
of whether the statute was civil or criminal as a matter of law, and thus a
question of statutory construction.110 The Court then looked at the
placement of the statute in the Kansas codes and analyzed the statute’s
language and structure.111 The Court found that two things manifested the
intent of the legislature that the statute not be punitive, and therefore not
criminal: (1) the placement of the statute in the probate code; and (2) the
statement within the statute that its purpose was to create a civil
commitment procedure.112
Previously, the Kansas Supreme Court had held, despite these two
points, that the “overriding” purpose of the statute was punitive—to
segregate people subject to it from the public—and that any treatment was
“incidental, at best.”113 The court held this in part because the legislature
had stated in its declaration of purpose that sexually violent predators could
not be treated under the existing civil commitment statute, which provided
for commitment of people with mental illnesses, and because no effort had
been made to treat any offenders.114 Accordingly, the Kansas Supreme
Court held that the primary purpose of the statute was to incarcerate, not to
provide treatment.115
The United States Supreme Court rejected this formulation, finding that
the statute could have more than one purpose, and noting that the mere
possibility that the Kansas legislature could have intended for sexually
violent predators to have treatment, in an ideal situation, was enough to
make this a civil statute.116
Justice Breyer dissented, arguing that the statute contained enough
punitive aspects that its purpose was ambiguous.117 Given that ambiguity,
Justice Breyer argued that the finding by the Kansas Supreme Court, that
the purpose of the statute was to incapacitate and not to treat offenders,
should be entitled to deference.118
107

521 U.S. 346 (1997) (5-4 decision).
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a21 (2005).
109
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360–61.
110
Id. at 361 (citing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986)).
111
Id. at 361–67.
112
Id. at 362.
113
In re Care & Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996), rev’d sub nom. Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
114
Id. at 136. The state supreme court found it particularly troubling that the statute did not even
allow for treatment until after a sexually violent predator had served the original criminal sentence. Id.
(quoting Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 753 (W.D. Wash. 1995), rev’d en banc, No. CV-9400480C (W.D. Wash. Feb. 10, 1998), aff’d, 192 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 1999), rev’d sub nom. Seling v.
Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001)).
115
Id.
116
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 367–69.
117
Id. at 379–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
118
Id. at 384–85. Justice Breyer supported the finding of the Kansas Supreme Court by analyzing
the statute and the record, which detailed the lack of effort made to treat Hendricks. Id. at 385–95.
108
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Six years later, Justice Breyer delivered the unanimous opinion in
Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Central Iowa, refusing to defer to the Iowa
Supreme Court’s finding of purpose.119 At issue in Fitzgerald was a tax on
the proceeds of slot machines at the State’s racetracks and riverboats; these
proceeds were the primary source of revenue for both types of gaming
establishment.120 At the State’s horse and dog racetracks, slot machine
proceeds were taxed at a maximum of 36%, while at the State’s riverboats,
they were taxed at a maximum of 20%.121 Finding that the proceeds were
similarly situated, the Iowa Supreme Court then found the scheme
irrational because the tax frustrated the purpose of the act creating it.122
The purpose found by the Iowa Supreme Court was to promote the State’s
racing industry in an effort to make an unprofitable venture profitable
again.123 Taxing the proceeds at the racetracks at a rate so much higher
than that of the riverboats damaged their profitability, defeating the purpose
of the act.124
The racetracks argued that when the state court determined the purpose
of the act, it was interpreting Iowa law, and that interpretation deserved the
usual deference.125 In other words, that interpretation was binding on the
United States Supreme Court.126 Here it would mean that the Supreme
Court was bound by the state-court finding that the purpose of the statute at
issue was to promote the racing industry in Iowa.127 With that threshold, it
would follow that the differential tax rate could not be rationally related to
that purpose.
The Supreme Court did not agree that it owed any deference to the state
court. Rather than accept the purpose the state court found—the actual128
purpose—the Supreme Court theorized multiple potential legitimate State
interests to which the differential tax could be rationally related. Finding
this rational relationship, the Court upheld the tax under the Federal
Constitution.129 To justify its decision not to defer to the state court, the
119

539 U.S. 103, 110 (2003).
Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 648 N.W.2d 555, 557, 559 (Iowa 2002), rev’d, 539
U.S. 103 (2003).
121
IOWA CODE ANN. § 99F.4A(6), .11 (West 2004).
122
Fitzgerald, 648 N.W.2d at 561.
123
Id. at 560.
124
Id. at 560–62. Before the Iowa Supreme Court, the State argued that the purpose of the act was to
encourage economic growth and promote agriculture. Id. at 560. The court found that, even if this
were the purpose of the act, this purpose, too, was frustrated by the higher tax rate on racetracks. Id. at
561.
125
Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103
(2003) (No. 02-695).
126
See Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 607–08 (1875) (holding that state
courts are the final interpreters of state law, with the United States Supreme Court limited to reviewing
only questions of federal law).
127
This was the stated purpose of the legislation. Fitzgerald, 648 N.W.2d at 560–61.
128
I use this term here to highlight the approach of the Iowa Supreme Court and not necessarily as
an endorsement of the correctness of that court’s holding.
129
Not to be outdone, the Iowa Supreme Court later struck down the tax under the Iowa
Constitution’s Equal Protection provision, although it did so not by creating a separate test under its
constitution but through an “independent application” of the federal test. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v.
Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 6–7 (Iowa 2004) (citing William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 500 (1977)). There is no (federal) question that
120
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Supreme Court stated, “the Constitution grants legislators, not courts, broad
authority (within the bounds of rationality) to decide whom they wish to
help with their tax laws and how much help those laws ought to provide.”130
In other words, rather than defer to the state court, the Supreme Court
deferred to the state legislature.
While this may seem analogous to Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence in
Bush v. Gore, which relied on the Constitution’s delegation of authority to
the state legislative branch, one important ingredient is missing. The
Constitution does not expressly delegate the authority to set state
nonelectoral policy to the state legislative branch. That power would be
reserved to the State as a whole, as evidenced by the Tenth Amendment,
which makes no distinction between the branches of state government.131
Certainly, there may be other arguments that support the decision to
defer to a particular branch of state government in the purpose context that
are different from those in the meaning context. For example, less
deference may be warranted in the meaning context because the difference
between saying what a statute means and saying why it exists suggests
different institutional competencies. First, saying what a statute means has
a more powerful effect on individuals than does stating the statute’s
purpose. The language and meaning of the statute determine how that
statute will operate on the world and how it will curtail people’s behavior
or penalize them for that behavior. Conversely, the purpose of legislation
has very little direct effect on the world, simply being the context in which
the legislation arose or an aspirational statement in the enacted legislation.
That context or aspirational statement can be used to help interpret the
meaning, or, given an improper purpose, it can make the statute invalid.
However, the purpose, by itself, usually changes nothing in practice.
Because it is not the purpose of a statute that affects people, but rather, the
language or meaning of the statute that does so, declaring the purpose runs
little risk of curtailing liberty or impairing individual rights. Accordingly,
as there is little reason to worry that the legislature could oppress political
minorities by its purpose alone, this provides more of a reason to defer to
the legislative branch in discerning purpose.
A second argument might be that, as the body that saw the need for the
legislation in the first place and created it, the legislature is in a better
position than are the courts to say why a particular statute is needed. Thus,
when the legislative act is presumptively valid—in other words, when
rational basis would apply under a constitutional analysis—federal courts
must defer to legislative possibilities rather than to the holdings of courts.
Conversely, where the judicial branch has greater competence, such as
when it interprets statutory meaning, giving effect to legislative intent and

the Iowa court could apply the federal test and reach a result that the United States Supreme Court had
rejected, as long as the Iowa court’s result rested on the Iowa Constitution. See Robert F. Williams,
State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-by-Case Adoptionism or Prospective
Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 1501, 1514 (2005).
130
Fitzgerald, 539 U.S. at 108.
131
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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culling a single meaning from multiple actors, the state judicial branch
warrants deference.
Yet an equally persuasive argument could be made to treat purpose
interpretations with more, rather than less, deference. Federal courts have
expertise equal to that of state courts in interpreting statutory language, and
statutory interpretation is something that all U.S. courts do. The search for
meaning is a matter of construction of language, clearly a question of law.
However, discerning the purpose or purposes of a law is not an act of
construction, necessarily, and may not be a question of law at all. Rather,
discerning a purpose may be more like finding a fact, a point the Supreme
Court itself seems to have accepted.132
Whether it is a question of fact or an unusual question of law, state
courts, as part of the state government, are in a much better position than
are federal courts to understand why particular state legislation was passed.
State judges are more likely, than are their federal counterparts, to know
what the public debate over the issues was when the legislation was
created. State judges are also more likely to have some insight into the
state legislative process. Thus, state courts are in a substantially better
position to interpret the purpose of state legislation than are federal
courts.133

C. Separation of Powers at the State Level
The lesson to be taken from all of these cases and modes of deference is
that, where the Constitution affords leeway to the States, the Court is likely
to defer to the state legislative branch at the expense of the state judiciary.
This was implied by the majority in Hendricks, and it was stated explicitly
by the Court in Fitzgerald. Conversely, where the Constitution limits State
power, the Court is more likely to defer to the interpretation of state law by
state courts, unless there is a reason to suspect the courts themselves of
interpreting the state law in order to mask a constitutional violation, or to
deprive a party of due process or equal protection.134
But there is nothing in the Federal Constitution that warrants giving
deference to the state legislative branch at the expense of the state judicial
branch in the majority of situations. The Federal Constitution does not
distinguish between state legislative and judicial branches in describing the
132

Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005) (treating the purpose of government
action as a question of fact); Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 543–44 (1982) (treating the
question of legislative intent of a constitutional proposition as one of fact).
133
On yet another side, the existence of the Fourteenth Amendment may suggest that States cannot
be trusted to tell the truth about what the purpose of some legislation is if that legislation impacts
individual rights. See Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 71–74 (1993) (chronicling John Bingham’s advocacy of the Fourteenth
Amendment as a means to enforce the Bill of Rights on the States that were disregarding the
Constitution).
134
This was Justice Rehnquist’s stated reason for deferring to the legislative branch in his
concurrence in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 115 (2000) (per curiam) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). See
also Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1900–01 (2001) (arguing that deference by federal courts to state sovereignty in
these cases is preferable because it leaves room for the state political process, rather than federal
judicial mandate and private suits, to remedy constitutional violations).
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powers of each.135 The only constitutional provision that limits the form
the state government may take and the distribution of powers within state
government is the Guarantee Clause, which provides, “[t]he United States
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature
cannot be convened), against domestic Violence.”136 Not only is the
Constitution silent about how States organize themselves within the bounds
of a republican form of government,137 the Supreme Court has held that
interpretation of this Clause is a political question and not justiciable.138
State constitutions, then, define how state governments are to be formed
and how various governmental powers should be exercised. Because the
institutions of state government are not identical to their federal
counterparts, the competence of those institutions is not identical to that of
their federal counterparts, and their powers need not be separated in exactly
the same way.139 In fact, state constitutions often give the judicial branch a
It is true, as Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in his concurrence in Bush v. Gore, that Article II,
Section 1, delegates the power to determine how to elect presidential electors to the legislature of each
State. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. Article I, Section 4, which details how members of Congress shall
be elected, also refers to state legislatures but contrasts that power with Congress’s power, rather than
the power of the state judicial branch. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. In other places as well, the
Constitution refers to different branches of state government, assuming a structure somewhat similar to
that of the federal government. See Michael C. Dorf, The Relevance of Federal Norms for State
Separation of Powers, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 51, 54–58 (1998) (illustrating that the amendment
procedure of Article V assumes a distinct state executive and state legislature, and Article III assumes
the existence of a state judicial branch). No section suggests anything about the primacy of one branch
over another. Moreover, there is no historical support for the significance of the language in Article II.
See generally Hayward H. Smith, History of the Article II Independent State Legislature Doctrine , 29
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731, 783–84 (2001) (concluding that the Framers of the Constitution never
understood Article II to show any particular solicitude towards state legislatures and that it has
historically only been used in make-weight arguments by politicians and courts).
136
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
137
This silence has not uniformly been interpreted to mean that the Constitution fails to limit the
exercise of power within state government. See Dorf, supra note 135, at 58 (arguing that the structure
of the Federal Constitution implies that States should be organized in federal-style separation of powers
terms); Louis H. Pollak, Judicial Power and “The Politics of the People,” 72 YALE L.J. 81, 88 (1962)
(stating that the Federal Constitution “postulated the idea of” a tripartite arrangement like that of the
federal government).
138
See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849) (determining that the question of selection
among competing state constitutions was valid for Congress to decide because “the Constitution of the
United States . . . has treated the subject as political in its nature, and placed the power in the hands of
that department”). That the issue is a political question does not leave the States entirely unregulated.
The federal government must guarantee that a State’s form of government is republican, and, with
federal courts out of the picture, it is up to Congress to interpret what that means. Congress has not
spoken on the subject.
Congress’s power is probably not unbounded. The Court’s opinion in Baker v. Carr may have
signaled that, in the right case, the Court will interpret issues touching on the Guarantee Clause. 369
U.S. 186, 208–32 (1962); see also Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:
Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 70–78 (1988) (arguing that the Guarantee Clause
is a judicially enforceable limit on federal power). The Supreme Court has suggested, based on
Merritt’s argument, that the Clause might limit Congress’s power to regulate State activities and would,
in those cases, be justiciable. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992) (citing
Merritt’s argument but not reaching the issue); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991) (same).
139
In fact, the Supreme Court has noted that this issue is a matter of state constitutional law:
Whether the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of a State shall be kept altogether distinct
and separate, or whether persons or collections of persons belonging to one department may, in
135
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much broader role in government than that possessed by the federal judicial
branch.140 For example, state courts are not bound by Article III’s
justiciability doctrines and, in fact, often share a policy-making role with
the legislative branch.141 Conversely, in some instances, state courts have a
narrower role in government than does the federal judicial branch.142 Thus,
separation of powers operates quite differently at the state level, and among
the States, from how it operates at the federal level,143 but it remains an
issue of state constitutional law.
Federal separation-of-powers doctrine limits the power of federal courts
to strike down federal legislation, on the ground that unelected judges
should not be given the chance to frustrate the will of the majority, except
in a few instances.144 In every case involving legislation, there is a chance
that the court could frustrate the will of the majority. It is easy to see that
when a court strikes down legislation as unconstitutional the court is
countering the will of the majority, but that is only the tip of the
respect to some matters, exert powers which, strictly speaking, pertain to another department of
government, is for the determination of the State.
Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902); see also Risser v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 549, 552 (7th Cir.
1991) (holding that the States need not have the same separation of powers limitations as the federal
government); G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3 (1998) (emphasizing that state
constitutions, not the Federal Constitution, dictate the distribution of power among the branches of state
government ); James A. Gardner, State Courts as Agents of Federalism: Power and Interpretation in
State Constitutional Law, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1725, 1744–46 (2003) (listing the variety of ways
state constitutions separate powers); Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1884–86 (noting that States are not
required to imitate the federal separation of powers system, and observing the variety of systems
developed across the States). Federal courts lack jurisdiction to determine whether State actions violate
the state’s constitution. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 392 (1798) (“[T]his court has no
jurisdiction to determine that any law of any state Legislature, contrary to the Constitution of such
State, is void.”).
140
Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1844–76 (illustrating the ways in which state courts “undertake and
discharge functions that are conventionally deemed beyond the Article III power”); Hans A. Linde, The
State and the Federal Courts in Governance: Vive la Différence!, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1273, 1273–
79 (2005) (highlighting the extent to which “state courts take on responsibilities federal courts
decline”).
141
See Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1861–68 (discussing the extent to which state courts are
involved in matters that would be nonjusticiable as political questions for Article III courts).
142
See Jim Rossi, Dual Constitutions and Constitutional Duels: Separation of Powers and State
Implementation of Federally Inspired Regulatory Programs and Standards, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1343, 1359–62, 1375–80 (2005) (discussing the strong nondelegation principle in state constitutional
law and other differences from federal organization of powers).
143
See Stanley H. Friedelbaum, State Courts and Separation of Powers: A Venerable Doctrine in
Varied Contexts, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1417, 1458–59 (1998) (suggesting that separation of powers is
becoming more meaningful in the States); Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1882–98 (discussing the
differences between federal and state legislatures and judiciaries); see also Robert A. Schapiro,
Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse , 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
79, 88–94, 99–107 (1998) (arguing that differences at the state and federal level counsel against the
States’ routine practive of adopting federal separation-of-powers concepts).
144
See REDISH, supra note 15, at 5, 17–19 (discussing the theoretical legitimacy of judicial
abstention); Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence:
Constitutional and Political
Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 707–08 (1995) (noting the Framers’ intent to limit the scope of
what appointed judges can hear, to prevent them from threatening the representative branches of
government). As the Supreme Court has said, federal courts may exercise power only “‘in the last
resort, and as a necessity,’ and only when adjudication is ‘consistent with a system of separated powers
and [the dispute is one] traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process.’”
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (alteration in Allen) (quoting Chi. & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v.
Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892), and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)).
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countermajoritarian iceberg. Every time a court is asked to interpret
legislation it risks frustrating the will of the majority, because the court
might come to a meaning different from what the majority of legislators
intended.145 Similarly, even where the court has interpreted the statute
“correctly,” the court might apply the statute to reach a conclusion different
from what a majority of legislators would have reached. Thus, every
interaction between federal courts and a legislative enactment brings with it
an inherent risk of contermajoritarian action.146 Because of this risk, many
scholars contend that federal courts should intervene only where
intervention is necessary to protect the political minority from a tyranny of
the majority.147
The countermajoritarian concern is not as warranted for many States as
it is for the federal government, and thus the state court powers need not be
quite so limited. Many States elect their judges, and once elected, because
they are more accountable to the electorate than are appointed judges, such
judges may pose less of a danger of frustrating the majority by creating a
tyranny of the minority.148 Even unelected state judges may arguably pose
145

Evidence of this phenomenon can be seen where Congress has amended statutes in response to
interpretations with which it did not agree. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2(2),
105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (2000)) (finding that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), was not an accurate interpretation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000)).
146
Part of this difficulty lies in the nature of statutory interpretation. How is it possible to assign a
single meaning to a complex collection of words put together by a number of different actors, subject to
differing influences, through an interactive process designed to frustrate the exercise of power? The
elusive nature of statutory interpretation and how courts should engage in it has been debated by many.
See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of Theory in Statutory
Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 252–54 (1992) (describing the views of three prominent voices in
the current statutory-interpretation debate: Judges Posner and Easterbrook in the Seventh Circuit and
Justice Scalia). For more on the debate between Judge Posner, on the one hand, and Judge Easterbrook
and Justice Scalia on the other, compare United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990) (en
banc) (Easterbrook, J.), aff’d sub nom. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991), superseded by
statute, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 80001(a),
280001, 108 Stat. 1985, 1985, 2095 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000)), as recognized in United
States v. Clark, 110 F.3d 15 (6th Cir. 1997), with id. at 1331–38 (Posner, J., dissenting). See also
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 275 (1990) (discussing whether an objective method
of statutory interpretation is possible); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 23–29 (1997) (outlining a textualist theory of statutory interpretation); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 533 (1983) (listing the sources judges draw
upon when interpreting statutes). For an alternate view of statutory interpretation, see WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 38–47 (1994) (describing and criticizing overreliance
on text to the exclusion of other interpretive tools).
147
See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 113–83 (1962) (arguing that the judicial power could be dangerous, but that the institutional
limits the Court puts on itself guard against the worst dangers); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 4–9 (1980) (describing the underlying theory of the Constitution
as grounded in the notion of government by the majority); STEPHEN P. POWERS & STANLEY ROTHMAN, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH?: CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 177–87 (2002) (criticizing recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence with respect to both constitutional and statutory interpretation); Redish,
supra note 144, at 707–08 (describing the countermajoritarian difficulty). But see Cynthia R. Farina,
Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452,
500 (1989) (suggesting that courts might have a role in defining public policy).
148
See Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by Correcting the
Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REV. 397, 414 (1999) (remarking on the use
of elections in state court regimes to hold judges politically accountable); Helen Hershkoff, Positive
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less of a countermajoritarian difficulty for state-law issues than do federal
judges for state or federal law issues. State judges may feel closer to their
communities than do federal judges simply by virtue of the fact that state
districts are smaller.149 Additionally, as a part of state government, state
judges may feel more bound to that smaller community of people and may
be more active in other ways in it.150 As a result, they may be more likely
to know what the will of the representative branches is and what remedies
are expected within the State.
This closeness is especially salient for statutory interpretation; state
judges are more likely than their federal counterparts to know what the
issues of public debate were when state legislation was proposed, what the
state legislature thought it was doing when it passed the legislation, and
what the situation in the State was before and after that legislation was
passed. That distinction may be less important at the trial level, where even
federal districts are within a State’s boundaries, but it would apply with
some force at the appellate level. Certainly, there is little to suggest that
the United States Supreme Court is in a better position than any state court
to understand why the state legislature thought a particular piece of
legislation was needed.
State courts also have more flexibility to respond to local concerns than
do federal courts, because state court decisions are not as far reaching, and,
as a result, they may be viewed as more democratically legitimate. 151 Thus,
a state judicial branch need not be restrained in the same way that the
federal judicial branch has restrained itself.
Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131,
1158–60 (1999) [hereinafter Hershkoff, Positive Rights] (discussing how judicial election results in
judicial vulnerability, which impacts decision making); Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1887 (noting the
effect of elected judiciaries (citing HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS
OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE 21 (7th ed. 1998))). Of course, state judges
may be ill-equipped to prevent tyrannies by the majority, but that is an entirely separate issue being
debated in states across the country. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective
Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 726–28 (1995) (questioning whether elected
judiciaries may be unable to protect minorities and whether they are capable of impartial decision
making); Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1887 (noting that critics question whether elected state judges
can sufficiently protect against the majority (citing DENNIS C. MUELLER, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 288
(1996))); Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra, at 1160–61 (expressing concern over the threat to the
judiciary’s rights-enforcing role when the judiciary is elected, because the judiciary will simply reflect
legislative choices).
149
See Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1887 (citing Donald W. Brodie & Hans A. Linde, State Court
Review of Administrative Action: Prescribing the Scope of Review, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 537, 542).
150
Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space between the Norms and
Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 976 (1985).
151
See Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1887, 1902 (commenting on the local, rather than national,
scope of state court decisions, which allows for more experimentation (quoting Burt Neuborne, Toward
Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 732 (1981))); Burt
Neuborne, Foreword, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 899
(1989) (discussing the democratic imprimatur of state courts). This flexibility, however, might limit
state judges’ use of politically unpopular remedies when those remedies are called for. Hershkoff,
supra note 134, at 1887 n.287 (citing CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND
AUDACIOUS JUDGES 148–50 (1996)); see also Dan T. Carter, “Let Justice Be Done”: Public Passion and
Judicial Courage in Modern Alabama, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 553, 554 (1998) (describing the refusal of the
Alabama Supreme Court to order new trials in the infamous, racially charged Scottsboro trials of 1931).
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Apart from the concerns about the accountability of institutions, federal
separation-of-powers theory seeks to take advantage of a different kind of
institutional competence: a faith in a functional division of labor.152 The
federal elected branches are better equipped than the federal courts to
create national policy and were designed that way.153 Conversely, federal
courts are more competent to adjudicate disputes among parties and to say
what legislation means or how it applies to the world.154 Coupled with this
separation of functions is the notion that the federal government is one of
limited jurisdiction, and hence, the judicial power of federal courts is
thought to be rather narrow.155
The functions of state courts, on the other hand, are not limited in this
way. First, they are courts of general jurisdiction, and therefore, are
viewed as having broader inherent powers than those of federal courts. 156
For example, state courts have always engaged in common-law creation,
while federal courts are thought to be able to create common law only in
limited circumstances.157 Many state constitutions give the state judicial
Rogan Kersh et al., “More a Distinction of Words than Things”: The Evolution of Separated
Powers in American States, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 5, 12 (1998); see also John Hart Ely, Another
Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World Where Courts Are No Different from
Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833, 833–35 (1991) (arguing that the judicial branch has characteristics
that make it an appropriate check on legislative power). But see Duncan Kennedy, Strategizing
Strategic Behavior in Legal Interpretation, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 785, 785 (suggesting that lawmaking is
not so easily divided between adjudicative and legislative institutions).
153
See HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., AMERICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL SOUL 122 (1991) (describing Hamilton’s
theory that “separation makes the powers work better” and that “power is not generalized but kept
distinct in sorts or classes and understood as power to perform some definite function (well)”);
Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1891 (describing the ways in which Congress’s setup enhances its policymaking ability); Abner J. Mikva, Why Judges Should Not Be Advicegivers: A Response to Professor
Neal Katyal, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1825, 1828 (1998) (arguing that both the fact of election and the
procedures that Congress follows make it institutionally better able to craft policy for the nation); David
L. Schapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519, 551–58 (1988) (comparing the
institutional advantages of courts and legislatures).
154
See Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1877–79 (defining the power granted by Article III in terms of
the traditional power of common-law courts to decide cases and controversies); see also Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (describing the judicial function as one of interpretation);
Fritz W. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis , 75 YALE L.J. 517,
518 (1966) (underscoring the court’s role in saying what the law is).
155
See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (comparing the limited jurisdiction of federal
courts with the general jurisdiction of state courts), superseded by statute, Federal Courts Study
Committee Implementation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 104-650, § 310(a), 104 Stat. 5104, 5113; Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV.
735, 739, 823–34 (2001) (describing the narrowness of the federal government’s powers as a structural
constitutional principle).
156
See Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1888–89 (remarking that state courts can often hear claims in
substantive areas, arising under both the common law and expansive state constitutions, that federal
courts cannot); Mark H. Zitzewitz, Comment, State v. Krotzer: Inherent Judicial Authority—Going
Where No Court Has Gone Before , 81 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1060 (1997) (describing the inherent
authority claimed by state courts).
157
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (determining that there is no general
federal common law and, rather than discerning principles of such nonexistent general common law,
federal judges are to apply the law of the State in which they sit); see also Martha A. Field, Sources of
Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 885 (1986) (discussing the scope of
power of federal courts to create federal common law); Michael Herz, Choosing Between Normative
and Descriptive Versions of the Judicial Role, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 725, 733 (1992) (noting the policymaking aspect of creating common law); Harry H. Wellington, The Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE
L.J. 486, 486 (1982) (describing the perception that the scope of judicial review should be limited).
152
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branch a broad responsibility to help make state policy or exercise
administrative power, either explicitly or through provisions that grant
positive rights to individuals.158 Additionally, state legislative and
executive branches are not necessarily organized the same way, or with the
same power, as their federal counterparts, which lessens their special
expertise or democratic responsiveness.159 Finally, many States have
mechanisms for direct, rather than representative democracy,160 which some
commentators suggest necessitates greater state-court vigilance to protect
against tyrannies of the majority made possible by a less deliberative form
of lawmaking.161 Based on the different institutional competencies of state
courts and state representative branches, there is little reason to assume that
state separation of powers must play out the same way as in the federal
system.162
Because the issue of state separation of powers is fundamentally a
matter of state constitutional law, federal courts should leave that balance
to the States as a unitary entity. Where the state court interpreted a state
statute, its very exercise of interpretation struck a particular balance. Even
if the state court exceeded its powers under the state constitution, the issue
is one that should be left to the States to resolve. In fact, because of
interbranch cooperation in state systems, it may be significantly easier for
state legislatures to correct erroneous state court decisions than it is for
Congress to correct erroneous federal rulings.163 Federal courts, even if
See Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1863–75, 1880–82, 1889–94 (describing the various ways in
which state courts exercise power that Article III courts lack and the ways in which state constitutional
provisions might differ from federal provisions).
159
See Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1895–98 (emphasizing that Article III’s preference for
legislative lawmaking on the federal level is not similarly expressed in state constitutions or divisions of
power); Rossi, supra note 142, at 1359–62, 1375–80 (discussing the strong nondelegation principle in
state constitutional law and other differences in organization of State powers).
160
See 33 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 233 tbl.5.14 (2000).
161
See Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites , 79
CORNELL L. REV. 527, 529 (1994); John F. Cooper, The Citizen Initiative Petition to Amend State
Constitutions: A Concept Whose Time Has Passed, or a Vigorous Component of Participatory
Democracy at the State Level?, 28 N.M. L. REV. 227, 258–59 (1998); Philip P. Frickey, The
Communion of Strangers: Representative Government, Direct Democracy, and the Privatization of the
Public Sphere, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 421, 435 (1998); David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An
Assessment of Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 40–42 (1995); cf. Clayton P.
Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV.
930, 974–84 (1988) (considering the problem of interest-group capture of plebiscites).
162
See Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225,
1307 (1999) (discussing the different effects that result when an institution or practice is appropriated
from one government to another). Despite this fact, some commentators suggest that the States ought to
mimic the federal system. See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Interbranch Accountability in State Government
and the Constitutional Requirement of Judicial Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 23 (1998)
(proposing that state and federal courts adopt the same approach to the constitutional requirement of
judicial independence); Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., Toward a New Partnership: The Future Relationship of
Federal and State Constitutional Law, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 729, 736 (1988) (“We simply cannot reason or
argue about what state constitutional law should be without resort to principles of federal constitutional
law . . . .”).
163
The combination of lawmaking by referendum; the smaller, more localized lawmaking body; and
the use of advisory opinions all work to limit the power of the state courts to frustrate the will of the
people. See Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 148, at 1162–66. Many states also allow for much
easier amendment of their state constitutions, providing a more significant check on the state courts’
powers to interpret their own constitution. Id. at 1164. My own State of Alabama reflects an extreme
158
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they have to power to do so, should not intervene. Therefore, federal
courts should defer to the balance struck by state courts and accept the
interpretation offered by the state court in an exercise of that balance,
unless there is an important federal interest that would conflict with that
deference.164
IV. TO DEFER OR NOT

We could adopt a number of different approaches to federalism, or get
rid of it entirely in favor of a unitary system. Instead, for structural,
functional, qualitative, economic, or philosophical reasons,165 we, as a
country, have retained not only a federal structure but a system of judicial
federalism in which much of the development of law, both state and
federal, is done by state courts.166 And if we have held on to this federal
arrangement for the value of diversity and experimentation or to promote
individual liberty or community, we should erode it only after deliberation
and consideration of the effects of such erosion.
Fundamental to maintaining states as separate from the federal
government is the ability of the State to define itself through its own
constitution. And given the starting point of analysis in this Article, that
the primacy of a branch of government is a matter of state constitutional
law, our inquiry necessarily must turn to explore what interest might be
sufficient to warrant not deferring to the state judicial branch once it has
struck a balance of state powers and interpreted state law. In order to
prevent inadvertent erosion of federalism, that reason would have to be a
relatively strong one that promotes some substantive federal interest, apart
from uniformity for the sake of uniformity.
The most compelling reason not to defer would be a circumstance in
which the federal court has a reason to suspect the state court of working to
frustrate a federal right or a federal interest.167 For example, where the state
court deviated from prior state law in a way that violated due process, as
the Supreme Court found had happened in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.

in this regard, with 777 amendments as of the date this Article went to press. See ALA. CONST.
164
Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626 (1996) (deferring to the Colorado Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the purpose of a constitutional amendment); Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527,
543–45 (1982) (treating the purpose of a proposition to amend the California Constitution as an issue of
fact, although that court agreed that the purpose stated in the proposition was the actual purpose);
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373–74 (1967) (deferring to the state court’s interpretation of a state
constitutional provision).
165
These terms are described by Michael Solimine and James Walker as some broad labels
applicable to some of the schools of thought about federalism. SOLIMINE & WALKER, supra note 18, at 8–
9.
166
See id. at 33 (describing the Hart and Wechsler paradigm in which state courts have some
responsibility for defining and enforcing federal law).
167
See PETER W. LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE
RELATIONS 83 (5th ed. 2004) (describing the possible problem of unlimited state authority to define
contracts undermining the Contracts Clause of the Constitution); Fitzgerald, supra note 51, at 158–71
(discussing the theories of federal supremacy and due process that are used to justify federal policing of
state court decisions).
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Patterson168 and Bouie v. City of Columbia,169 the federal court would have
a constitutional duty to intervene. In this way, state courts might interpret
state law in a way that frustrates review by federal courts and hampers
enforcement of important federal rights.170
Conversely, the most
compelling reason to defer would be where the state-law issue was truly
discrete from any federal issue, such that no federal interest could be said
to be at stake.
Short of these situations, deciding whether to defer is much more
difficult. The vast majority of State action is reviewed under a standard
that is designed to be quite deferential: rational-basis review. 171 In fact,
rational-basis review is so deferential that some commentators have
suggested that it is not review but is instead the absence of review, the
refusal to commit judicial resources to subjects outside of core
constitutional concerns.172 Rational-basis review does not enforce any
substantive right or enumerated power.173 Rather, it is a way to limit the
countermajoritarian power of Article III judges.174 Thus, rational-basis
review embodies a policy of deference to the federal legislative branch as
well as to the States. However, the rational-basis test does not enforce any
positive constitutional delegation of power to the state legislative branch
that would justify not treating the States as unitary entities.
And so, on the one hand, it is easy to see why, as a function of accepted
notions of federal institutional competence, federal courts, in exercising
rational-basis review, reflexively defer to the legislative branch, any
legislative branch, at the expense of any gloss a court has put on the law.
But as explained above, assessing institutional competence at the state level
is not for federal courts to address in most instances.175 The question of
institutional competence is a matter of state constitutional law in the first
instance, making it a question more properly dealt with by state courts
168

357 U.S. 449, 457 (1958).
378 U.S. 347, 350 (1964).
170
See Fitzgerald, supra note 51, at 87–90 (arguing that the Supreme Court should defer to statecourt judgments, unless the Court explains why it has reason to suspect the States of frustrating the
operation of federal law).
171
See Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277,
1282–84 (1993) (critiquing the application of rational-basis review to laws burdening the poor);
Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflecting on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 NW.
U. L. REV. 410, 410–11 (1993) (noting that constitutional jurisprudence identifies very few classes for
heightened review).
172
Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 148, at 1153; see also Loffredo, supra note 171, at 1282–
84 (explaining the very deferential review of laws burdening the poor); Sager, supra note 171, at 410
(discussing the Court’s minimum protection of economic rights).
173
See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term—Foreword: The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 49 (1989).
174
See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 84–95 (1994) (describing
judicial minimalism); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: The Road to
Judicial Supremacy (pt. 1), 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 335 (1998) (discussing the ongoing debate over the
ability of an unelected branch to overturn popular decisions); James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope
of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, Address at the Congress on Jurisprudence and Law
Reform (Aug. 9, 1893), in 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893) (noting the different obligations of
legislators and judges in interpreting the Constitution).
175
For examples of when the institutional competence of state courts may need to be examined in
order to protect individual rights, see Hershkoff, Positive Rights, supra note 148, at 1159–60.
169
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under the Supreme Court’s notions of dual federalism.176 Thus, without
some substantive federal interest to enforce, federal courts have no good
reason not to defer to state court interpretations of state law.
One could argue that the federal interest at stake is uniformity; the
rational-basis test must mean the same thing everywhere that it is
applied.177 Uniformity is an important federal interest, but only when it
serves to protect federal sovereignty and supremacy. If the federal
government has no sovereignty interest, then it has no interest in
uniformity. To say otherwise would take us to the world envisioned by the
Supreme Court in Swift v. Tyson,178 where the development of common
law by federal courts spread uniform common law throughout the country
for the sake of uniformity alone. Going there is certainly a choice we could
make as a society, but we have not made it, and the Supreme Court
specifically rejected it in Erie.179 Without a substantive federal interest to
be enforced by the rational-basis test, it is difficult to see why federal
courts should exercise independent judgment on an issue of state law any
time a state court has spoken.
At the opposite end of the review spectrum, where a fundamental right
is at stake, or a suspect class affected, the federal constitutional test to
apply would be strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny, unlike rational-basis review,
is employed to enforce substantive federal constitutional values of equality
and liberty. The Fourteenth Amendment represents a fundamental shift of
power away from the States and to the federal government to protect
individual rights.180 Individual rights to liberty and equality are at stake
even where strict scrutiny is not employed, and the Fourteenth Amendment
places vindication of those rights primarily in the federal government. 181
So perhaps the proper touchstone here is simply whether a liberty or
equality issue is at stake. If so, federal courts have an interest that warrants
exercising independent review, not deferring to at least some state court
interpretations.
Certainly, however, there are reasons to defer even here. For example,
allowing States to interpret their laws narrowly so as to avoid federal
constitutional questions strengthens the quality of state government by
allowing the state judicial branch to participate in enforcing the Federal
Constitution. It also limits the extension of constitutional principles
without a solid foundation. So, federal courts, it would seem, have stronger
reasons both to defer and not to defer in the strict-scrutiny context.
See Schapiro, supra note 15, at 1409 (noting that, under Erie, interpretation of state constitutions
rests with with the high court of each State).
177
But see Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1457, 1483–86
(2005) (noting an inevitable lack of uniformity in the application of even ostensibly uniform federal
tests).
178
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled, Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
179
Erie, 304 U.S. at 79–80.
180
See Aynes, supra note 133, at 66–74 (describing early theories of incorporation of the Bill of
Rights against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment); see also McCormick, supra note 66, at
370 (noting that Congress enacted the Fourteenth Amendment because States could not be trusted to
sufficiently protect equality and liberty).
181
See McCormick, supra note 66, at 370–71 (suggesting that this arrangement maximizes liberty
and equality for all citizens).
176
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In either context, where the state court is overprotecting a federal
interest or underprotecting a state interest, it is difficult to see what
federalism value is promoted by failing to defer to the state-court
interpretation of state law.182 One argument for not deferring to state-court
interpretations could be that, if States wish to deviate from the federal
model, they should do so by grounding decisions in their own constitutions,
rather than by relying on federal constitutional principles. In other words,
let the States be politically accountable for their decisions rather than
suggesting that the federal government is responsible.183
By not allowing state courts to shift responsibility, federal courts may
enhance political responsibility in a more positive way as well. States and
localities are given the chance to use the state political process to remedy
constitutional violations, which may give those remedies greater credibility
with the people of the State, which, in turn, should make those remedies
more effective.184 The effectiveness of the remedy is enhanced not only by
the chance for democratic resolution, but also by the fact that it is chosen
by insiders rather than being imposed from outside.185 Experimentation by
state legislatures may lead to a greater ability by the states to develop
innovative ways to remedy constitutional problems.186 That innovation
benefits us all.187 This state innovation, however, might be achieved by
ensuring a strong role for the state judiciary, regardless of whether the
constitutional limit state courts rely on is a federal or state one.
This inquiry has implications far beyond the meaning or purpose state
courts find, as well. State courts’ processes necessarily impact the
deference equation. For example, for a brief period of time the Connecticut
Supreme Court adopted a method of statutory interpretation different from
the method used in federal courts.188 That court held that it could use any
See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1249 (1978) (“Unless competing constitutional concerns are at stake,
there would seem to be no occasion for an abiding federal judicial role in policing state courts against
overly generous interpretations of federal constitutional values.”). Justice Stevens has repeatedly raised
this issue in dissents to cases that reverse an overprotection of federal rights. Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S.
Ct. 2516, 2540–41 (2006) (Stevens., J., dissenting); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 695 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1067–70 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183
This seems to be the gist of Scalia’s concurrence in Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at 2530–31
(Scalia, J., concurring), in which he discusses the difficulty of Kansas voters remedying the state
supreme court’s error. So Scalia, it seems, would argue that this accountability is essential to the
political process because voters must know how to change the law that a state court is applying if they
do not agree with a result.
184
See Hershkoff, supra note 134, at 1900–01 (noting the Court’s approach of giving States the
opportunity to address their equal protection and due process violations).
185
Id. at 1902.
186
In his dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, Justice Brandeis expressed this point in a nowfamous line: “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country.” 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
187
See id.; see also Lawrence G. Sager, Cool Federalism and the Life-Cycle of Moral Progress, 46
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1385, 1387–88 (2005) (demonstrating that liberal moral progress, such as the
right to gay marriage or the right of the terminally ill to die with dignity, comes about through a process
of invention by a single State, propogation to other States, and then consolidation within the federal
system).
188
See State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562, 582 (Conn. 2003) (explicitly rejecting the plain-meaning
rule used by the Unied States Supreme Court in statutory interpretation), superseded by statute, Act of
182
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contextual information to interpret the text of a statute, even if that text was
not ambiguous. That approach is contrary to what is called the “plain
meaning rule,” which is used by federal courts and which allows a court to
consult extratextual materials only when statutory language is
ambiguous.189 The method of statutory interpretation should be a matter
negotiated between the States’ legislative and judicial branches, and not
necessarily imposed from outside, unless that method is somehow used to
frustrate a substantive federal interest. Similarly, State choices regarding
the amount of deference reviewing state courts give to lower state tribunals
may differ from the level of deference given by their federal counterparts.
It is difficult to see how that decision implicates any substantive federal
interest that would warrant imposing the federal model on the States.
Ultimately, a lack of deference could impact the States’ abilities to interpret
the substantive provisions of their own constitutions where those
constitutions mirror the language of the Federal Constitution, or perhaps
even where similar rights are only mentioned. Even for those who argue
against a dual-federalism model, this result would encroach too far into
State autonomy and sovereignty.
V. CONCLUSION
Federal courts encounter state-law issues in a great variety of situations,
with varying levels of state-court interpretation attached. To date, federal
courts have treated state courts sometimes as if they were lower federal
courts and sometimes as if they were the courts of completely separate
sovereigns, without explaining why. While this lack of transparency gives
federal courts the greatest amount of discretion and power, it does little to
support the legitimacy of federal courts. This Article has attempted to
describe when the Supreme Court will defer and when it will not, and has
found that difference somewhat counterintuitive and in conflict with the
Supreme Court’s notions of dual sovereignty. While dual sovereignty
might be neither truly possible nor desirable in the age of the administrative
state, it can provide some practical boundaries to divide the labor of the
courts in our federal system when they necessarily interact. Thus, this
Article has suggested that federal courts defer to state courts unless an issue
presents a substantive federal interest that warrants independent federal
review. I hope that this provides some normative guidance that the courts
could consider in negotiating those interactions.

June 26, 2003, 2003 Conn. Pub. Acts 154 (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-2z (West 2005)). The
Connecticut legislature enacted a statute to overrule that part of Courchesne, and the Connecticut
Supreme Court acquiesced without analyzing whether the legislative overruling was valid under the
state constitution. Goodyear v. Discala, 849 A.2d 791, 796 n.4 (Conn. 2004) (citing Paul Dinto Elec.
Contractors, Inc. v. City of Waterbury, 835 A.2d 33, 39 n.10 (Conn. 2003)). Despite the fact that
Connecticut no longer deviates from the federal method, the example remains a useful illustration of the
possibility that a State could makes this change.
189
See Courchesne, 816 A.2d at 578–86 (explaining reasons for rejecting the plain-meaning rule and
adopting instead a broader inquiry into the meaning of the statutory language in all cases).
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